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Abstract 
Islamic financing instruments can be categorised into profit and loss/risk sharing and non-
participatory instruments. Although profit and loss sharing instruments such as musharakah are 
widely accepted as the ideal form of Islamic financing, prior studies suggest that alternative 
instruments such as murabahah are preferred by Islamic banks. Nevertheless, prior studies did 
not explore factors that influence the use of Islamic financing among non-financial firms. Our 
study fills this gap and contributes new knowledge in several ways. First, we find no evidence 
of widespread use of Islamic financing instruments across non-financial firms. This is because 
the instruments are mostly used by less profitable firms with higher leverage (i.e., risky firms). 
Second, we find that profit and loss sharing instruments are hardly used, whilst the use of 
murabahah is dominant. Consistent with the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory, 
further analysis suggests that users with a lower asset base (to serve as collateral) are associated 
with murabahah financing. Third, we present a critical discourse on the contentious nature of 
murabahah as practised. The economic significance and ethical issues associated with 
murabahah as practised should trigger serious efforts to steer Islamic corporate financing 
towards risk-sharing more than the controversial rent-seeking practice.      
 
Key words: Capital Structure; Islamic Finance; Islamic Financial Instruments; Malaysia; 
Profit and Loss Sharing; Murabahah   
Introduction  
The presence of the Islamic finance industry in the global capital market is increasingly 
acknowledged. Unfortunately, the development of this industry has not been without issues. In 
theory, profit and loss/risk sharing has been accepted as the epistemological foundation of 
Islamic finance because it is consistent with the Islamic philosophy of promoting fairness 
(Ayub, 2007; Mirakhor and Smolo, 2013). In practice, the cornerstone of the growth in Islamic 
finance, thus far propelled by governments and the strong participation of financial institutions, 
has been criticised for deviating from profit and loss sharing (Warde, 2000; Saleem, 2005; 
Ayub, 2007; Raphaeli, 2009; Khan, 2010). The divergence between theory and practice is 
indeed an interesting issue (Rice, 1999). This issue motivates us to explore the reality of Islamic 
corporate financing with three research questions in mind, as described below. 
 
First, despite numerous positive claims regarding the growing importance of Islamic finance 
(e.g., Financial Times, 2011), we still do not know to what extent non-financial firms are using 
Islamic instruments in corporate financing, and why. Prior studies have mainly documented 
financing instruments offered by Islamic banks (e.g., Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Chong and 
Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010), but the literature falls short of providing empirical evidence on the use 
of Islamic financing instruments by non-financial firms. This gap in knowledge motivates us 
to provide such empirical evidence as a novel contribution to the literature.  
 
Second, we question which type of Islamic financing instruments is most used by non-financial 
firms, and why. Appendix 1 summarises the different types of Islamic instruments. While profit 
and loss-based instruments such as musharakah are mostly preferred because they are 
consistent with the Islamic philosophy of promoting fairness (Ayub, 2007; Mirakhor and 
Smolo, 2013), the way that alternative instruments such as murabahah is practised, has been 
criticised by many learned scholars (Saleem, 2005; Ayub, 2007; Khan, 2010). Although 
previous studies have recognised the preference of Islamic banks for offering murabahah 
financing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010), it is still 
empirically unknown which instrument is more often used among non-financial firms. This 
gap in the knowledge motivates us to identify the most commonly used Islamic instrument and 
explore factors that might influence such usage among non-financial firms. 
    
Third, we question whether murabahah as practised can be considered ethically sound. This 
line of inquiry is motivated by the prospect that Islamic finance might be able to create a 
socially responsible, ethical and stable financial system (Kayed and Hassan, 2011; Ullah et al., 
2014). Our critical discourse on murabahah as practised aims to reinforce the significance of 
the empirical evidence presented in this study. This discourse is not unreasonable given that a 
number of Sharia scholars, legal scholars, Islamic finance practitioners and academics have 
also raised ethical concerns about the current practice of murabahah (Warde, 2000; Saleem, 
2005; Ayub, 2007; Raphaeli, 2009; Khan, 2010). Fostering such concerns is not inconsistent 
with socially responsible literature (see, for example, Graafland et al., 2004; Ullah et al., 2014; 
O’Mara-Shimek et al., 2015). We believe that more discourse of this sort can trigger serious 
efforts to steer the Islamic finance industry towards the ideal paradigmatic form. 
 
Our study contributes new knowledge about the reality of Islamic finance in several ways. 
First, we find no evidence of widespread use of Islamic financing across non-financial firms, 
despite numerous claims regarding the growing importance of Islamic finance. We find that 
Islamic instruments penetrate long-term financing more than short-term financing. Our further 
analysis reveals that Islamic financing allows highly geared, less profitable firms (i.e., risky 
firms) to access further financing. This finding suggests that Islamic financing seems to appeal 
to risky firms, who would otherwise face difficulties in accessing additional conventional 
financing. This insight, which has not been documented in prior studies, enhances our 
knowledge about the significant role of Islamic financing in helping risky firms in need.  
 
Second, we find that the presence of profit and loss sharing (i.e., musharakah) in corporate 
financing is negligible, whereas the use of murabahah is prevalent. We discover that murabahah 
constitutes about 30% of corporate firms’ use of Islamic financing instruments. Consistent with 
the prediction of moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Ayub, 
2007), further analysis suggests that users with lower tangible fixed assets (to serve as 
collateral) exhibit a greater use of murabahah. This observation implies that collateral 
deficiency dis-incentivises financiers from sharing the risk (or losses) of corporate firms that 
are susceptible to managerial moral hazard. Financiers, in this case, will secure a fixed return 
by pushing the use of murabahah instead of offering profit and loss sharing. This intuition, 
which has not been documented in prior studies, advances our understanding of why 
murabahah has become a preferred instrument in Islamic corporate financing. 
 
Third, we argue that murabahah can be abused so as to camouflage riba-based financing that 
deviates from profit and loss sharing theory. Although deviation from this theory can help 
weakly collateralised firms to access further financing, the prospect of riba being camouflaged 
through murabahah should trigger unreserved religious-based ethical discourse due to the 
exploitative motives such a practice may entail. Contentiously practised murabahah may as 
well trigger doubt on the ability of Islamic financing practice, in its current form, to offer a 
legitimate ethical financing alternative.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We first present the literature review that 
includes the background on the Islamic finance industry, the findings of previous studies as 
well as the discourses that motivate our research questions, and detailed definitions of 
musharakah and murabahah. Next, we examine the extent and nature of the Islamic instruments 
used by non-financial firms. We then empirically analyse the characteristics of users. We also 
perform empirical analysis to elucidate the popularity of murabahah financing. In the 
penultimate section, we offer a critical discourse on murabahah as it is currently practised, from 
an ethical perspective. Finally we conclude the paper by offering some practical implications.  
 
Literature review  
Islamic finance industry: background 
In terms of its ascendancy, the growth of Islamic financial assets worldwide is perceived to 
have exceeded 15% annually (Khan, 2010). The total assets in Sharia-compliant financial 
institutions doubled to US$900 billion between 2006 and 2011 (Financial Times, 2011). The 
Islamic finance industry has since been forecasted to expand by US$1.6 trillion in assets over 
three years as London pushes for an increased share of the global Islamic finance market 
(Financial Times, 2013). This industry appeals to the global market because of its potential for 
the creation of an ethical and stable financial system (Kayed and Hassan, 2011). 
 
Prohibition of riba is one of the key features of Islamic finance,1 and part of a wider ethical 
framework concerned with preserving justice and equity in financial relationships (Mews and 
Abraham, 2006). Although Islamic scholars have not been able to reach an absolute agreement 
on the definition of riba, they generally describe it as any addition to, or increase of, a thing 
                                                 
1 The arguments in this paper are built mainly on the prohibition of riba. For the sake of brevity, other features of 
Islamic finance such as the prohibitions of gharar and forbidden activities are not covered here.  
(e.g., money, goods or other form of instrument) over and above its original size or the amount 
lent, which involves an exploitation of the economically weak by strong and resourceful 
entities (Asad, 1980). Exploitation in this sense is categorically considered to be riba. Lending 
based on interest is considered illegitimate exploitation because the financier is guaranteed a 
return (i.e., interest income) even when the investment project being financed makes a loss.  
 
Islamic corporate financing: what we know and what we do not 
The prohibition of riba has inspired the development of various types of Islamic financing 
instruments, such as summarised in Appendix 1. However, it is still empirically unknown to 
what extent non-financial firms use Islamic financing in corporate financing. This gap in the 
knowledge motivates us to provide evidence that will answer our first research question:  
 
Q1: To what extent do non-financial firms use Islamic instruments in corporate 
financing, and why? 
 
Using data collected from Islamic banks, several studies found that alternatives to profit and 
loss sharing, such as murabahah, have significantly dominated the Islamic capital market 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010). Table 1 summarises the 
findings from these studies.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
       ------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Recognising that previous studies do not fully capture the extent of Islamic instruments used 
by corporate firms, our study contributes towards filling this gap by addressing our second 
research question: 
 
Q2: Which type of Islamic instruments is most used by non-financial firms, and why? 
 
Musharakah in the context of profit and loss sharing theory  
In musharakah, the shareholders of a corporate firm and other suppliers of financial capital 
(e.g., banks) are envisaged to be partners. Each partner, also referred to as rabbul-mal, 
contributes financial capital in varying proportions and can choose to contribute human capital 
(i.e., management skill/expertise) to actively manage the underlying firm. In musharakah, the 
suppliers of financial capital will share both the upside and downside potential of the 
underlying investment projects undertaken by the partnership (i.e., the corporate firm). The 
ratio or percentage of profit sharing is pre-determined and agreed upon by the partners at the 
inception of the partnership contract. In the case of loss-making projects, the losses will be 
shared across partners according to the proportion of financial capital contributed. Therefore, 
musharakah is consistent with the Islamic concept of fairness whereby the parties to the 
contract will share in symmetric payoffs. Arrangements of this sort should not entail riba or 
illegitimate exploitation because musharakah partners are not guaranteed positive payoffs since 
their payoffs will depend upon the performance of the underlying investment projects. 
 
Murabahah as an alternative instrument in the context of moral-hazard-risk 
avoidance theory 
The Islamic finance industry is perceived to have prospered mainly through the use of 
murabahah financing (Financial Times. 2014). Murabahah is described as a “cost-plus sale” 
contract, whereby parties to a genuine sale contract will bargain on a margin of profit (or mark-
up) over the known cost (or principal amount) of an underlying asset. In the case of a credit 
sale, the payment of the principal amount plus the agreed mark-up is made by the buyer (i.e., 
corporate firm) to the seller (i.e., financier) on a deferred basis. This is called murabahah-
mu’ajjal, which refers to an arrangement whereby a financier (e.g., an Islamic bank), upon 
request from a corporate firm, purchases an underlying asset from a third party, and then sells 
it to the corporate firm at cost plus a mark-up on a deferred payment basis. In Malaysia, 
murabahah-mu’ajjal with a long-term maturity is known as al-bai-bithaman ajil (BBA). The 
mark-up can be calculated either as a percentage of the underlying’s cost, or as a fixed amount, 
which implies a fixed return on the investment for the financier (Raphaeli, 2009). 
 
According to contemporary Sharia scholars, setting a selling price higher than the original spot 
price is permitted, provided that the risk of the underlying asset is borne by the financier until 
the ownership is transferred to the corporate firm. The fixed mark-up or profit margin can be 
viewed as the financier’s compensation for bearing the risk associated with (temporary) 
ownership of the underlying asset. This risk refers to the potential inability of the corporate 
firm to purchase the underlying asset from the financier, which would cause the financier to 
incur administration costs in finding a new buyer. The profit margin is also viewed as a 
compensation for bearing after-sales risk. This refers to the risk of a defective underlying asset, 
in the event of which the corporate firm will claim compensation or repair costs from the 
financier, who is acting as the seller in the contract (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
 
The popularity of murabahah, as an alternative instrument to profit and loss sharing, has been 
described as the Islamic banks’ rational response to their financial contracting environment that 
is susceptible to typical agency problems (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Ayub, 2007). We argue 
that murabahah, which entitles financiers a fixed return on their investment, seems more 
suitable for financiers or investors with low risk-taking incentives, who are neither interested 
in actively monitoring the activities of the corporate firms they finance, nor in sharing the risk 
(or losses) associated with the corporate managers’ moral hazard. 
 
Building upon the existing literature (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Ayub, 2007), we identify 
two practical issues associated with profit and loss sharing. Our arguments are derived from 
the perspective of risk-averse financiers such as banks or investors with low risk-taking 
incentives, as opposed to equity investors. First, offering musharakah financing will expose 
financiers (i.e., non-managing partners) more to an asymmetric information environment 
(Ayub, 2007). In this scenario, the financiers’ return on their investment will be exposed to the 
moral hazard of the managing partners, who manage the underlying projects or firm. Managing 
partners can manipulate reported profits to deceive non-managing partners, or abuse the 
partnership’s resources to serve their private interests, or invest excessively in risky projects 
that may (unintentionally) increase the probability of losses being generated. This scenario is 
very similar to the agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control of 
the firm, as frequently described in the corporate governance literature. 
 
Second, monitoring is costly and, in the absence of proper monitoring by financiers, the 
potential for managerial moral hazard is great. In addition, it is simply not in the economic 
interest of the non-managing partners such as banks and other risk-averse investors to actively 
engage in managing or monitoring the underlying firm’s activities because they generally 
require a return on their investment that is lower than that demanded by equity investors. This 
category of financiers prefers a fixed return on their investment (or priority of claims in the 
case of the underlying firm’s bankruptcy), which provides little incentive for them to monitor 
the projects undertaken by corporate firms’ managers.  
 
We argue that managerial moral hazard in firms with a lower asset base will expose financiers 
to greater risk due to their inability to fully recover investment losses, if any, by liquidating the 
firms’ assets. Default risk can be reduced by having a larger asset base since the assets could 
be used as collateral (Scott, 1977). This implies that firms with a lower asset base tend to face 
higher default risk due to the lower collateral level. In this regard, we introduce moral-hazard-
risk avoidance theory to enrich our understanding of the role managerial moral hazard plays in 
influencing the use of murabahah. This theory suggests that moral hazard in firms with a lower 
asset base will expose financiers to a greater risk of not being able to recoup any investment 
losses fully by liquidating the firms’ assets. Consequently, greater collateral deficiency will 
cause financiers to demand a fixed return, and hence they will prefer to offer murabahah 
financing. Entitlement to a fixed return will save financiers from sharing the consequences of 
managerial moral hazard that frequently manifest in poor performance.  
 
In sum, moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory predicts that a lower corporate asset base will 
induce financiers to impose a greater use of murabahah, hence a fixed return, in financing 
corporate firms. This is because the corporate assets in this case will be not sufficiently 
available to serve as security in dealing with the disastrous consequences of corporate 
managers’ moral hazard. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with a lower asset base will be 
associated with a greater use of murabahah financing. This hypothesis is tested in the empirical 
analysis section as an attempt to elucidate the dominance of murabahah in Islamic corporate 
financing. 
 
Empirical analysis 
Institutional background 
Malaysia is a suitable setting for this study due to the significant Islamic capital market in the 
country. At the end of 2004, the market share of Islamic banking assets in Malaysia was 26.2% 
(Chong and Liu, 2009). In 2005, sukuk denominated in Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) dominated 
the global sukuk market with a 65.7% share (Wilson, 2008). The Malaysian government has 
indeed played an active role in promoting the use of Islamic instruments in corporate financing 
activities. The implementation of the Islamic Financial Services Act (IFSA), which took effect 
on 30 June 2013, represented a landmark initiative by the government to further promote the 
development of Islamic finance. Although such a conducive environment in Malaysia may 
have incentivised corporate firms in the country to finance their investment activities in Islamic 
way, little is known of the extent to which these firms have embraced Islamic financing. 
 
The nature of Islamic financing used in Malaysia also presents an interesting case for discourse 
because learned Islamic scholars have contended that the emergence of Islamic banking and 
finance in Malaysia has been “going too fast, and that in its rush to grow, Malaysian finance 
was cutting too many corners” (Warde, 2000, p. 127). Islamic finance in Malaysia has 
flourished under a highly pragmatic approach, by challenging Malaysian Islamic scholars to 
pursue ijtihad in an effort to generate new ideas.2 Warde (2000, p. 85) criticised the situation 
as follows: “A number of Islamic research centres and universities engaged in a vast effort to 
legitimate modern finance, and in particular to create an ‘Islamic capital market’ that would 
use specially designed interest-free bonds and other securities. Many Malaysian ‘innovations’ 
in that area are not deemed acceptable to Sharia boards in more conservative Gulf States”. Our 
                                                 
2 Ijtihad is “the efforts expanded by jurists to extract solutions to problems based on the principles of primary and 
secondary sources, where rules of behaviour are not explicitly addressed by the primary sources, i.e. Quran and 
Sunnah.” (Iqbal and Mirakhor, p. x). 
study is developed against the backdrop of such criticism. Scrutinising the extent and nature of 
the Islamic instruments used in corporate financing in Malaysia is crucial as its experience may 
well become a benchmark for emerging Islamic capital markets elsewhere in the world.  
 
To what extent are Islamic financing instruments used in corporate financing? 
Our examination of the annual reports of 816 corporate firms listed on the Main Market of 
Bursa Malaysia produced 60 companies (7%) that had used Islamic financing during 2012, and 
whose annual reports contained adequate information for the purpose of this study. The 
distribution of these firms, arranged by industry categories, is presented in Table 2. It is 
observed that the use of Islamic financing is spread across industries but the practice seems to 
be dominated by the trading and services industry. The effect of industry is further tested 
through regression analysis. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of both the Islamic and conventional financing 
instruments used during 2012 by the 60 corporate firms under study. Panel A reports that, on 
average, conventional borrowing represented a considerable portion of corporate financing, 
with an average amount of MYR1.2 billion. On average, Islamic financing accounted for 
MYR978 million of total corporate financing. Long-term financing dominated short-term 
financing in both cases. Long-term financing refers to financing contracts with a term to 
maturity longer than one year, and short-term financing refers to financing contracts with a 
maturity of one year or less. Conventional equity financing seems to have been the most 
popular mode of corporate financing, with an average amount of MYR3.1 billion. 
 ------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the Islamic-to-conventional financing 
ratios for the 60 users of Islamic financing. The ratios indicate the extent of Islamic financing 
as compared to conventional borrowing. It can be observed that the average ratio for long-term 
Islamic financing over long-term debt is 50% while the average ratio for short-term Islamic 
financing over short-term debt is only 29%. This observation suggests that Islamic financing 
has gained a higher penetration rate in the case of long-term corporate financing.  
 
Why do firms use Islamic financing in corporate financing? 
This study reveals a very low penetration rate of Islamic financing among the 816 Malaysian 
corporate firms studied. This striking observation triggers the question of what type of firm 
considers Islamic instruments in their corporate financing. We employed mean/median 
comparison tests and probit regression to explore plausible answers to this query. The 60 users 
were matched, based on size and industry, with firms that did not use Islamic financing. We 
assigned the value of 1 to firms that used, and the value of 0 to firms that did not use Islamic 
instruments for financing activities. Due to the absence of theoretical studies on the 
determinants of corporate use of Islamic financing, we considered in our analysis the 
explanatory variables commonly used in capital structure studies. These were leverage ratios, 
size, profitability, liquidity, the market-to-book ratio, and tangibility (e.g., Scott, 1977; Bevan 
and Danbolt, 2002; Adam and Goyal, 2008; Dzolkarnaini, 2009). The definitions of these 
variables are presented in Appendix 2.  
 
Comparative statistics for the Islamic financing users and non-users, together with the results 
of mean/median comparison tests, are reported in Table 4. It can be observed that users have a 
significantly higher level of borrowing, as measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets (LTD/TA) and the ratio of total debt to total assets (TD/TA). Islamic financing users are 
also significantly less profitable than non-users. Profitability (PROF) is measured as the 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation divided by total assets.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
We further test, by employing probit regressions, whether highly levered and less profitable 
firms have a greater tendency to resort to Islamic financing. The regression results are presented 
in Table 5. The results reported in columns 1 to 4 consistently suggest that Islamic financing 
tends to be used by less profitable firms and firms with higher leverage. These results imply 
that a firm’s existing borrowing and profitability are two important factors that are associated 
with the use of Islamic financing. Difficulties of accessing the conventional debt market as a 
consequence of weak financial performance and a high level of borrowing can perhaps explain 
why these firms may have considered Islamic instruments for financing their investment 
activities. Islamic financing is a viable alternative for this category of firms due to possible 
adverse selection and high demand to invest in Islamic instruments created by the Islamic 
capital market (Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill, 2013). If we define less profitable firms with 
higher leverage as riskier firms, then the results from Table 5, taken together, suggest that 
Islamic financing tends to help risky firms, who otherwise may face difficulties in accessing 
additional conventional financing. To our knowledge, this insight has not been documented in 
other studies; hence it forms a novel contribution of our study. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Which type of Islamic instrument is used most often in corporate financing, and 
why? 
This study contributes further by exploring the nature of the Islamic instruments used in 
corporate financing. Table 6 reports the types of Islamic financial instruments used by the 60 
corporate firms in our sample. It shows that their reliance on profit and loss sharing instruments 
(i.e., musharakah) is negligible, comprising only 7% of the Islamic financing used. Murabahah 
(including murabahah-mu’ajjal as in BBA), as an alternative to profit and loss sharing, appears 
to be a preferred mode of Islamic financing, accounting for 30% of the Islamic financing used. 
The reliance on alternatives to profit and loss sharing has been amplified with the innovation 
of Islamic term notes and commercial papers, which represent about 10% of Islamic corporate 
financing in Malaysia. This is very much consistent with the adoption of a highly pragmatic 
approach that has encouraged Islamic scholars to generate new ideas for a more progressive 
Islamic finance (Warde, 2000). In addition, 36% of the Islamic financing in the sample are 
categorised as unclassified sukuk, whose nature is not ascertainable due to a lack of disclosure 
in the firms’ annual reports.3 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The findings reported in Table 6 are consistent with the findings of previous studies that have 
documented the prevalence of murabahah in Islamic banking (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; 
                                                 
3 These data limitations hamper the empirical investigation on sukuk, but dealing with this issue is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010). Instead of relying solely on data from Islamic banks, we 
contribute to the literature by presenting unique scientific evidence gleaned from corporate 
firms’ annual reports to produce a more complete and recent picture of the reality of Islamic 
corporate financing in Malaysia. Our findings form part of a continuation of academic efforts 
to document the prevalent use of murabahah over the years. 
 
The prevalent use of murabahah has raised concern over the extent to which such practice 
deviates from profit and loss sharing as the ideal form of Islamic finance. Therefore, we attempt 
to empirically explore a plausible rationale for the use of murabahah as an alternative to profit 
and loss sharing. The dependent variable is the ratio of murabahah to the total value of Islamic 
financing used by firms. Tobit regressions are employed in this analysis due to the presence of 
many observations with zero value in the case of non-users of murabahah. The regression 
results are reported in Table 7.    
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The results in columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 consistently show that leverage, as measured based on 
long-term debt (LTD/TA) and total debt (TD/TA), is negatively related to the extent of 
murabahah use. This observation may suggest that firms that rely on a greater use of murabahah 
may have experienced difficulties in accessing conventional borrowing (as shown through low 
leverage). There could be a number of reasons why a firm might face difficulties in accessing 
conventional borrowing. However, data limitations restrict us from exploring this further.  
 
Another observation from Table 7 is the significant negative relationship between tangibility 
(TANG) and the amount of murabahah used by firms. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of 
tangible fixed assets (net of accumulated depreciation) to the firm’s book value of total assets. 
This variable measures a firm’s collateral level. The moral-hazard-risk avoidance theory 
introduced in this study predicts that the tendency for financiers to demand a fixed return will 
be greater for firms with a lower asset base. This is due to the unavailability of sufficient assets 
to serve as collateral against the firms’ downside potential in the presence of managerial moral 
hazard. This prediction is consistent with the negative relationship between tangibility and the 
extent of murabahah use, as reported in Table 7. In this case, financiers would be entitled to a 
fixed return instead of return that would vary according to the performance of the underlying 
corporate firms. Imposing a fixed return, as in the case of murabahah, is a practical solution 
that allows financiers to avoid sharing losses resulting from corporate firms’ managerial moral 
hazard. Murabahah financing can thus be viewed as a risk management strategy from the 
Islamic financiers’ perspective, which is an interesting insight we offer in this study. 
Nevertheless, such a risk management strategy obviously means that financiers do not share 
both the upside and downside potential of corporate firms. Further, there must be ethical 
concerns associated with imposing a fixed return on counterparties in a weak bargaining 
position. These issues are discussed in the following section.  
 
Discussion  
Is murabahah as practised ethically sound? 
Questioning corporate practice has been a persistent agenda among ethicists when placing 
business ethics at the heart of corporate practice (Painter-Morland, 2010; Beverungen, Dunne 
and Hoedemaekers, 2013; Moore, 2015). While previous discourses commonly delve into 
conventional corporate practice, critical discourse about Islamic corporate practice is 
uncommon. Therefore, we enrich the literature on business ethics by asking our third research 
question: 
 Q3: Can murabahah as practised be considered ethically sound? 
 
This question is answered through our critical discourse on murabahah practice, which aims to 
reinforce some ethical issues as the practice tends to deviate from the religious-based ethical 
objective of promoting fair transactions. This discourse is crucial because our study thus far 
reveals the economic significance of murabahah as an alternative to profit-and-loss-sharing-
based financing. Table 7, presented earlier, documents some evidence that murabahah 
financing is more common among firms in the trading and services industry (TRADS) in 
Malaysia. It was also indicated earlier in Table 2 that firms in the trading and services industry 
had embraced Islamic financing more than firms in other industries. These findings, taken 
together, suggest that murabahah is playing a key role in fuelling the growth of Islamic finance. 
Therefore, it is a socially responsible call to urge that murabahah practice vis-à-vis Islamic 
finance moves forward in a universally acceptable direction. Promoting truly Islamic practice 
does correspond with socially responsible conduct that serves, constructively, the needs of 
society (Graafland, Mazereeuw and Yahia, 2004; Ullah, Jamali and Harwood, 2014; O’Mara-
Shimek, Guilllen and Banon Gomis, 2015). 
 
Deviation from profit and loss sharing theory 
Although the murabahah model has been allowed by Sharia scholars to be implemented in 
financing transactions, the implementation has not been without issues. There are issues 
associated with the way murabahah is structured in practice. It is commonly acknowledged that 
the murabahah structure is often used to mimic conventional borrowing (Financial Times, 
2014). In many cases, a financier such as an Islamic bank will simply finance a specific asset 
or investment project desired by a corporate firm, while expecting to receive a specified profit, 
which does not vary according to the profit- or loss-making position of the underlying asset or 
project. The financier’s exposure to the corporate firm’s default risk can also be minimised 
because the underlying asset being financed can simultaneously be used as collateral until the 
cost-plus-mark-up amount is fully settled by the corporate firm (Ayub, 2007). The certain profit 
and the presence of collateral to protect the financier’s interest clearly indicate a deviation from 
profit and loss sharing, the epistemological foundation of Islamic finance.  
 
In addition, Islamic banks are naturally not genuinely interested in the trading of the underlying 
asset. Based on their personal recollections of murabahah as practised by Islamic banks, some 
bankers claimed that Islamic banks tend to keep ownership of the underlying asset for a very 
short period before the asset is sold to the client (e.g. corporate firm). “It may not amount to 
more than a few seconds as a vast majority of transactions are closed simultaneously…” 
(Saleem, 2005, p. 23). Selling the underlying asset immediately to the previously identified 
client following a purchase from the original seller means that the Islamic banks are hardly 
exposed to the ownership risk associated with the asset at all. “What is more, since their 
ownership period can be measured in seconds, the banks do not assume any operational risks, 
normally associated with trading activities. Indeed, in practice, banks purchase the commodity 
or goods only after the customer has agreed in writing to purchase it from the bank at a profit.” 
(Saleem, 2005, p. 23). We argue that the guaranteed and immediate nature of the onward sale 
to the customer not only forms a deviation from profit and loss sharing, but also renders the 
justification for the profit margin as compensation for ownership risk deceptive. 
 
Substance over form  
In Malaysia, murabahah, as in the case of BBA for property financing, typically involves the 
purchase of an underlying asset by an Islamic bank directly from a customer. The bank then 
immediately sells the same underlying back to the customer at cost plus a specified profit. This 
buy-back arrangement, known as bai’ al ‘inah, is not considered to be Sharia-compliant in 
many Gulf States’ jurisdictions (Ayub, 2007). We acknowledge that Islamic values and 
practices may differ widely among Muslims (Graafland, Mazereeuw and Yahia, 2006). 
However, the transaction just described is, more often than not, simply trading in disguise or 
dressed up with legal form, in which the bank has no liability or responsibility to compensate 
the customer in the event of delivery failure, or an underlying that is not fit for use or 
occupation, or that is defective. This reality renders the justification for profit as compensation 
for after-sales risk deceptive. 
 
In the case of Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ors, Koperasi 
Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka Bhd (Third Party) & Other cases [2009] 1 CLJ 419, the bank had 
purchased the property directly from the customer and thereafter sold the same property to the 
customer at a higher price. It was held by the court that the transaction was not a bona fide sale 
but a mere financing transaction. It was further held that the bank has to be a genuine seller in 
order for such transactions to be acceptable from an Islamic perspective. This clearly 
demonstrates that the substance of such murabahah practice forms not only a deviation from 
profit and loss sharing theory, but also a camouflage of riba-based financing activity.  
 
Camouflaged riba  
In murabahah as practised, we can presume that the specified profit or mark-up is typically 
non-negotiable from the perspective of the customer (i.e. firm), who is in a weak bargaining 
position, but in need of financing to finance growth opportunities. The results presented earlier 
suggest that firms that resort to Islamic financing are normally those with weaker financial 
performance (Table 5), and that those that deviate from profit and loss sharing instruments tend 
to have a lower asset base (Table 7). These conditions may have made it difficult for these 
firms to access not just conventional loans, but also profit and loss sharing instruments, due to 
the moral-hazard-risk avoidance behaviour of financiers. Accepting a fixed cost imposed 
through murabahah financing allows these financially weak firms to access further financing.    
 
Although deviation from profit and loss sharing helps financially weak firms to access 
financing, the certainty of the profit margin for the financiers has been criticised as simply 
camouflaging riba-based conventional lending. In addition, it has been established in the 
literature that Islamic banks determine their profit margin by mimicking the interest rate 
charged on identical conventional lending (Saleem, 2005; Chong and Liu, 2009; Raphaeli, 
2009; Khan, 2010). The rate does not necessarily refer only to a standard benchmark rate such 
as LIBOR but also incorporates a risk premium or excess, which at times could result in 
excessive profits for the Islamic banks. Such murabahah practice is feared to entail riba.  
 
We acknowledge that it is almost impossible to discern the primary and true intentions of the 
parties involved in murabahah transactions. Nevertheless, Islamic teaching generally approves 
only of profit levels that do not lead to exploitation, which means that excessive pricing and/or 
harm to the community are not looked upon positively (Ali, Al-Aali, and Al-Owaihan, 2013). 
This Islamic view is not inconsistent with the pursuit of profit from the perspectives of ethics 
and corporate social responsibility (Vranceanu, 2014). Unfortunately, in the case of murabahah 
as practised today, anecdotal evidence suggests that customers have complained bitterly about 
the Islamic banks’ deviation from religious objectives, and that most Islamic banks collect 
higher profit margin than the interest charged by conventional banks (Raphaeli, 2009). For 
example, in the case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v. Adnan Omar [1994] 3 CLJ 735, it was 
held that a murabahah transaction had resulted in the customer being liable to pay an amount 
far higher than he would have been liable to pay in a conventional loan with interest. Such 
example of murabahah practice has clearly produced a burdensome outcome instead of the fair 
transactions intended in Islam.  
 
Society’s wellbeing will be enhanced if the virtues of Islamic frameworks are truly 
implemented (Uddin, 2003; Moore, 2015; O’Mara-Shimek, Guilllen and Banon Gomis, 2015). 
However, the murabahah practices just described seem far from enhancing society’s wellbeing. 
Our ethical discourse has highlighted three key moral dimensions that describe plausible 
characteristics of murabahah as practised today and these are summarised in Table 8. Although 
deviating from profit and loss sharing would help financially weaker firms to obtain financing 
that would otherwise not be obtainable through the conventional debt market, the way 
murabahah is constructed in practice has caused great concern over whether it has been 
exploited irresponsibly and deviates from fair transactions. “While ethical duties emphasize 
responsibility for engaging in business activities, exploitation is prohibited” (Ali, Al-Aali, and 
Al-Owaihan, 2013, p. 471). The fact that murabahah is so often used in practice (as reported in 
Table 6) provides a compelling case for bringing this ethical discourse forward. The ethical 
dimension of murabahah as practised has largely been neglected by the mainstream literature. 
Our study can only provide a foundation for the socially responsible exploration that must 
continue. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
            ------------------------------- 
 
Conclusions  
In theory, profit and loss/risk sharing is widely accepted as the paradigmatic form of Islamic 
finance. While the Islamic finance industry is claimed to have been growing at unprecedented 
rates, very little is known as to the extent to which the theory has been implemented in corporate 
financing practice. Although prior studies find that Islamic banks tend to deviate from profit 
and loss sharing practice, the literature falls short of providing empirical evidence on Islamic 
corporate financing practice among non-financial firms. This research gap allows our study to 
contribute empirical evidence that reveals the gap between the theory and practice of Islamic 
corporate financing. In doing so, we have addressed three research questions: 
 
Q1: To what extent do non-financial firms use Islamic financing, and why? 
Q2: Which type of Islamic instruments is most used by non-financial firms, and why? 
Q3: Can murabahah as practised be considered ethically sound? 
 
Unlike prior studies that have relied on data from Islamic banks, we gathered data from non-
financial firms. We find that profit-and-loss-based instruments (i.e., musharakah) form only 
7% of Islamic financing used by corporate firms in Malaysia. Alternatives instruments, such 
as murabahah (including murabahah-mu’ajjal as in BBA), form about 30% of the Islamic 
instruments used by the firms. These findings advance our knowledge about the reality of 
Islamic corporate financing, which hardly promotes profit and loss/risk sharing. We further 
explain below how the remaining findings of this study contribute new knowledge to the 
literatures on corporate social responsibility, business ethics and Islamic finance. 
 
In terms of the contribution to corporate social responsibility, the results of our empirical 
analysis suggest that Islamic financing facilitates highly geared, less profitable firms’ access to 
financial capital. These risky firms, which otherwise would face difficulties in accessing 
conventional financing due to their high default risk, would normally be shut out of the 
conventional capital market. Islamic financing can be seen as complementing the role of the 
conventional capital market when less fortunate firms are financed by Islamic instruments in a 
way that gears up their business activities to foster economic growth. The empirical evidence 
presented here reinforces the findings on the contribution Islamic financing makes to the 
welfare of corporate firms. By implication, corporate practitioners can see Islamic financing as 
a second-best solution in their efforts to obtain further financing for the firms they manage. 
This is an interesting insight that has not been articulated in prior studies. 
 
In terms of its contribution to business ethics, this study offers a critical review of the prospects 
of Islamic finance practice in terms of fostering fair transactions. There is no doubt that Islamic 
finance aims to promote good business ethics as prohibition of riba is part of a wider ethical 
framework (Mews and Abraham, 2006). However, our concern is that instruments such as 
murabahah can be exploited by financiers, allowing them to profit from financially weak firms. 
The results of our regression analysis suggest that weakly collateralised firms are more likely 
to rely on a greater use of murabahah. The practice of imposing a fixed profit margin on a 
hardly genuine trade should trigger an ethical concern, especially when the counterparty is in 
a weak bargaining position. Taking the profit margin as a compensation for bearing ownership 
risk hardly adds up in the absence of a genuine trade. The potential for camouflaging riba in 
this way should cause a grave concern too. If widespread, it would render Islamic finance 
practice substantially indistinguishable from conventional finance. Although imposing a fixed 
return for financing projects is perhaps a common risk management strategy employed by 
financiers in the presence of the potential moral hazard among corporate managers, flawed 
murabahah practice risks the legitimacy of Islamic finance. Therefore, apart from 
implementing ethically sound financing instruments, there is a responsibility to ensure 
legitimate murabahah practice, which ultimately lies on the shoulders of the Sharia scholars 
who serve on the Islamic banks’ Sharia supervisory boards.  
 In terms of its contribution to Islamic finance, it is important to note that this study is not 
criticising the murabahah principle. The critical arguments are levelled at the potentially flawed 
murabahah practice. The potential gap between the principle and practice of murabahah 
perceived in this study provides a case for the furthering of this discourse. More research to 
explore the gap is important because our findings show that murabahah is a significant 
component of Islamic corporate financing practice. The murabahah structure, if abused widely 
in the way described in this paper, will hardly render Islamic finance practice a real alternative 
to the controversial practice of conventional finance. Implementing Islamic financing by 
pressing a fixed cost on financially weak firms may fuel credit bubbles in the same way that 
conventional finance fuels recurring financial crisis. 
 
To conclude, although deviation from profit and loss/risk sharing theory can help weak firms 
to access financing, any attempt to camouflage riba should alarm us from a religious-based 
ethical perspective. We suggest that murabahah financing deserves a positive ethical and 
religious appraisal if it is carried out with fairness instead of being exploited as a rent-seeking 
instrument. The empirical evidence and critical discourse of this study urge Sharia scholars, 
policymakers and regulators to scrutinise more closely the practice of Islamic corporate 
financing. It is necessary to bring about a change in the policymaking and regulatory approach 
to Islamic instruments, with three clear objectives: to scrutinise that the instruments are not 
abused by financial institutions as rent-seeking tools; to innovate Islamic financing practices 
that fulfil their potential as a real alternative to conventional financing; and to provide 
incentives that would further encourage the use of profit and loss sharing instruments. Islamic 
finance scholars and practitioners have to work hand-in-hand with policymakers and regulators 
to formulate appropriate incentives if they are to achieve the abovementioned objectives. Our 
study sets up the motivation for such serious efforts to be initiated. 
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 Table 1  
Findings from prior studies on Islamic financing instruments offered by Islamic banks    
 
Author(s) Period Sample Findings 
Aggarwal and 
Yousef (2000) 
1995 Large Islamic banks  Murabahah 45.1% 
 Musharakah 16.3%  
  
Chong and Liu 
(2009) 
 
2004 Islamic banks in 
Malaysia 
 Murabahah 56.9% 
 Musharakah 0.4%  
 
Khan (2010) 
 
2006 Major Islamic banks 
around the world 
 
Percentages of murabahah: 
 
 Al Rajhi Bank 42% 
 Kuwait Finance House 62.7% 
 Dubai Islamic Bank 55.6% 
 Bank Islam Malaysia 89.7% 
 
Note: Musharakah is a profit and loss sharing instrument. Murabahah is an alternative instrument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 2  
Distribution of Islamic financing users by industry categories 
 
Industry Frequency % 
Trading and services (TRADS) 20           33  
Properties and REITs (PROPS) 11           18  
Industrial production (INDS) 9           15  
Construction (CONS) 6           10  
Other industries 14           24  
Total 60 100 
 
  
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of corporate financing 
 
Panel A: The amount of Islamic and conventional financing 
 
Islamic financial instruments  
(MYR million) 
 Conventional 
 
 Debt instruments 
(MYR million) 
Equity 
(MYR 
million)  
  
Short term 
(ST) 
Long term 
(LT) Total 
 Short term 
(ST) 
Long term 
(LT) Total 
Mean 144 848 978  392 776 1,168 3,107 
Median 10 60 102  72 32 154 528 
Min - - -  - - - 35 
Max 2,000 14,499 15,549  4,923 13,216 14,820 36,137 
Stdev 377 2,294 2,432  852 2,096 2,592 6,955 
 
Panel B: Islamic-to-conventional financing ratios  
 
Total IFIs / 
Total Debt 
LT IFIs / 
LT Debt 
ST IFIs /  
ST Debt 
Mean           0.41            0.50            0.29  
Median           0.33            0.51            0.12  
Min           0.02                 -                   -    
Max           1.00            1.00            1.00  
Stdev           0.31            0.38            0.34  
Note: IFIs = Islamic financial instruments 
  
Table 4 
Comparative statistics between users and non-users of Islamic financing 
 Mean    Median    
 
Users 
(N=60)   
Non-
users 
(N=60)  
t-test      
(t-
value)  
Users 
(N=60)  
Non-
users 
(N=60)  
Mann-
Whitney 
Test       
(z-
value)  
       
LTD/TA 0.18 0.11 2.74 *** 0.16 0.07 2.87 *** 
TD/TA 0.32 0.20 4.07 *** 0.29 0.18 3.94 *** 
PROF 0.05 0.11 -2.54 *** 0.08 0.09 -2.12 ** 
LIQD 1.70 3.11 -1.53 1.39 1.67 -1.70 * 
MTB 1.14 1.22 -0.43 0.94 0.96 -0.08 
TANG 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.08 
SIZE 14.16 13.95 0.65 14.16 13.99 0.42 
The table presents the comparative statistics for the characteristics of users and non-users of Islamic 
financing. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). 
 
Table 5 
Why firms use Islamic instruments in corporate financing? 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LTD/TA 2.82*** 2.98***   
 (2.65)    (2.72)      
TD/TA   2.64*** 2.61*** 
   (3.15) (3.10) 
PROF -6.61*** -7.40*** -6.04*** -6.37*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.14) (-2.73) (-2.76) 
LIQD -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.50) (-1.60) (-1.04) (-0.99) 
MTB 0.50 0.54 0.59 0.61 
 (1.31)    (1.39)    (1.53)    (1.56)    
TANG 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.31 
 (0.61)    (0.72)    (0.58)    (0.62)    
SIZE -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.64) (-0.68) (-0.44) (-0.46) 
TRADS  0.14  0.09 
  (0.42)  (0.26) 
PROPS  -0.08  -0.01 
  (-0.22)  (-0.04) 
INDS  0.37  0.15 
  (0.96)  (0.41) 
CONS  0.27  0.14 
  (0.60)  (0.32) 
CONSTANT 0.90 0.89 0.28 0.28 
 (0.77)    (0.73)    (0.24)    (0.24)    
     
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Log pseudolikelihood -71.30 -70.60 -70.40 -70.28 
Wald χ2 16.81*** 16.33* 21.66*** 21.02** 
Probit regressions for 120 observations. The dependent variable is binary (1 = firm uses Islamic 
financing; 0 = firm does not use Islamic financing). All variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
Robust standard errors are used (not reported). z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
 
  
Table 6  
Distribution of Islamic instruments in corporate financing 
 
Islamic financial instruments MYR billion % 
Musharakah 4.1       7  
Murabahah (including BBA) 17.6       30  
Ijarah 5.8       10  
Islamic term notes and commercial papers 5.9       10  
Unclassified sukuk* 21.3       36  
Others 4.0       7  
Total 58.7 100 
    *Note: Inadequate disclosure in firms’ annual reports 
  
Table 7  
Why firms use murabahah in corporate financing? 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LTD/TA -4.02*  -5.56***  
 (-1.86)     (-2.80)     
TD/TA  -5.04**  -5.39*** 
  (-2.49)     (-2.87)    
PROF 1.98 -1.73 -0.03 -3.99 
 (0.52) (0.42) (-0.01) (-1.07) 
LIQD -0.38 -0.48 -0.51 -0.63 
 (-1.23) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.84) 
MTB -1.77** -1.63** -1.06 -1.25 
 (-2.45)    (-2.22)    (-1.24)    (-1.48)    
TANG -2.21** -2.50** -3.15*** -3.40*** 
 (-2.18)    (-2.45)    (-3.41)    (-3.59)    
SIZE -0.23 -0.18 -0.28 -0.28 
 (-1.15) (-0.94) (-1.46) (-1.53) 
TRADS 1.32* 1.17 2.25*** 2.25*** 
 (1.71) (1.52) (2.79) (2.77) 
PROPS -0.14 -0.26 0.61 0.48 
 (-0.17) (-0.30) (0.76) (0.61) 
INDS -0.13 0.70 -0.17 -0.73 
 (-0.14) (0.74) (-0.21) (-0.87) 
CONS -0.56 -0.23 0.14 0.54 
 (-0.58) (-0.24) (0.14) (0.57) 
CONSTANT 6.01 6.50** 7.88 9.16 
 (2.16)    (2.46)    (2.83)    (3.48)    
     
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.18 
Log likelihood -96.14 -94.60 -59.12 -58.99 
No. of observations 99 99 40 40 
Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the ratio of murabahah to total Islamic 
financing used by firms. Columns (1) and (2) include all Islamic financing users. Columns 
(3) and (4) include only the users of murabahah and/or musharakah. All independent 
variables are defined in Appendix 2. Robust standard errors are used (not reported). t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  
Table 8  
Moral dimensions of murabahah as practised today    
 
Moral dimension Parameters 
Deviation from profit and 
loss sharing theory 
 Profit to the financier does not vary according to the 
performance of the underlying asset or project being 
financed 
 Financier bears negligible ownership risk associated with 
the underlying asset due to immediate (re)sale of the asset 
Substance over form  It is essentially a financial transaction due to the absence 
of a genuine trading activity 
 Doubtful justification for the entitlement to fixed profit 
Camouflaged riba  The mark-up is hardly negotiable by customer (i.e. firm), 
who is typically in a weak bargaining position 
 The mark-up rate may mimic or greater than the interest 
rate charged on an identical conventional loan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1  
Different types of Islamic financial instruments*    
 
Classification Participatory/Non-
participatory 
 
Islamic financial 
instrument 
Specific nature 
Debt-like 
instruments 
Non-participatory Murabahah Cost-plus sale 
  Tawarruq An extension to 
Murabahah involving 
3rd party 
 
  ‘Inah 
 
Sell and buy back  
  Ijarah Leases 
 
  Istisna’ Contract to 
manufacture an asset 
 
Equity-like 
instruments 
Participatory/Profit 
and loss sharing 
Musharakah Partnership: each party 
contributes capital 
 
  Mudarabah Partnership between 
supplier of capital and 
managing partner 
 
*adapted from Minhat and Dzolkarnaini (2016) 
  
Appendix 2 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Name Definitions  
LTD/TA The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
TD/TA The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
PROF The ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets.   
 
LIQD The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
MTB The ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. 
 
TANG The ratio of tangible fixed assets net of accumulated 
depreciation to total assets. 
 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
TRADS Trading and services industry 
PROPS Properties and REITs industry 
INDS Industrial production industry 
CONS Construction industry 
 
 
 
 
